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Glossary 
AACA Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic, a project by AMAP 
ACIA Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, a project by  AMAP 
AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, an Arctic Council Working Group 
AMSA Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
BBOE Billion Barrels of Oil Equivalent 
CAFF Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, an Arctic Council Working Group 
IIASA The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LOSC The Law of the Sea Convention 
NEP Northeast Passage 
NSR  Northern Sea Route 
NWP Northwest Passage 
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PAME Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, an Arctic Council Working Group 
RCP Representative Concentration Pathway 
SPA Shared Climate Policy Assumption 
SSP Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 
TEU Unit of cargo (twenty-foot equivalent units) 
TSR Trans-Siberian Railroad 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USGS The United States Geological Survey 
WMS Weather and Marine Services 
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1 Introduction 
The world is changing, and so is the Arctic. The Arctic has already witnessed the impacts of 
climate change and with fullest force. At the same time, the changes in northern latitudes are 
often brought up as an example of possible positive impacts of the changing climate, with 
new trade routes, resources and economic opportunities emerging. Different nations, 
corporations and interest groups are now reforming their Arctic plans and strategies. The 
extent of activities in the area remains to be seen, but it is clear that any actions should be 
based on reliable information. The conditions in the Arctic are both changing and 
challenging, and the capability to produce information about these conditions is currently 
limited compared to most of the world. 
TWASE is a research project funded by the Academy of Finland and aims Towards better 
tailored Weather and marine forecasts in the Arctic to serve Sustainable Economic activities 
and infrastructure1. The project started in September 2014 and will finish in August 2018. 
TWASE will identify the emerging needs for Weather and Marine Services (WMS) in the 
Eurasian Arctic and develop these services in collaboration with relevant stakeholders. In 
addition to everyday weather forecasts, WMS include ice charts, warnings, and satellite-
based observations. These are needed for economic activities such as navigation, aviation, 
fishing, energy production, manufacturing, and tourism due to their weather sensitivity. After 
identifying the needs for WMS, the project will estimate the future economic value of WMS.  
To obtain an understanding of the emerging needs for WMS, the project team and a set of 
Arctic experts, mainly through input obtained in a two-day workshop (see Appendix 1 for 
participant list), have constructed a set of socio-economic scenarios by 2040 for the Eurasian 
Arctic2. The timeframe for the scenarios was set by the project team to reflect a relevant time 
horizon for the development of the WMSs; not too close to the present to allow for potential 
                                                          
 
1 http://polar-meteorology.fmi.fi/projects/twase.html 
2 The Eurasian Arctic covers the Northern Sea Route from the Norwegian Sea to the Bering 
Sea (both the coastal version and the straight crossing version) and the land areas nearby 
(mainly Northern Fennoscandia and Northern Russia). 
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development of economic activities and WMSs, but not too far in the future as this entails 
too large uncertainties for strategic decision making on WMS. Development paths of the 
drivers that result in the scenarios were not analysed, as this is not needed for the assessment 
of the future need and value of WMS. 
The first step in the process was a literature review on existing Arctic scenarios, underlying 
driving forces and other relevant issues related to the Eurasian Arctic. To obtain an 
understanding of the importance and relevance of these drivers, an online pre-survey was 
sent out to the Arctic experts participating in the workshop, held on the 30th and 31st March, 
2015 at the Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) in Helsinki, Finland. This report describes 
the process and discussions undertaken prior (Section 2.3 of this report) and during the 
workshop (Sections 3.1 and 3.2), presents the results of the workshop and the scenarios 
constructed based on the workshop results (Sections 3.3 and 4). The emphasis is on the 
Eurasian Arctic but, where relevant, the Arctic as a whole is discussed as well.  
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2 Literature review – the Arctic now and in the future 
The aim of the literature review was to collect a diverse set of relevant background material 
and identify key development drivers to be used in the expert workshop, with a focus on 
socio-economic literature concerning Arctic development. To start, we explored reports by 
the Nordic Council of Ministers (e.g. Nordregio 2011), the Arctic Human Development 
Report II (eds. Larsen & Fondahl, 2014a) and reports by the Arctic Council and its working 
groups (e.g. Andrew 2014, PAME 2013, AMAP 2010, AMSA 2009, ACIA 2004, CAFF 
2001). To gain a further understanding of the development trends mentioned in these reports, 
we searched for scientific papers dealing with issues such as oil and gas exploration and 
shipping in the Arctic. In addition, we explored existing socio-economic scenarios for the 
Arctic presented in the academic and grey literature. The report was written prior to the global 
climate negotiations in Paris, December 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015). Therefore, the anticipated 
phase-out from coal and oil use and its impact on Arctic resource extraction have not been 
discussed in this report. 
2.1 The Arctic now 
“The Arctic” can be defined in many ways. Perhaps the most common understanding of the 
Arctic is to define the area geographically as the polar regions that are located north of the 
Arctic Circle (66° 33'N). Arctic countries are then the eight countries that possess land areas 
within this region: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. These countries form the Arctic 
Council together with permanent representatives of Indigenous peoples and selected observer 
organizations. The Arctic is a diverse and heterogeneous area in many respects: different 
cultures, nationalities, economies and ecosystems coexist and interact together.  
The population estimates for the Arctic vary between 4 to 10 million depending on what is 
considered as the Arctic area (Andrew, 2014). According to Heleniak and Bogoyavlensky 
(2014), the population has stabilized at just over 4 million and is not projected to increase 
much further. The number of Indigenous people has been growing annually by 1.5 % 
(Nordregio, 2011). Currently, over 5 million tourists visits the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions 
annually (Hall & Saarinen, 2010).  
4 
 
The Arctic population embraces different ethnicities, and many different identities and 
cultures exist, having major differences between them. The Indigenous peoples have lived in 
the area for millennia and non-Indigenous peoples have arrived through migration. 
Nowadays, the awareness of “mixed” identities in Arctic communities has increased. 
Contemporary Indigenous peoples try to find a liveable combination of “modernity” and 
“unchanging tradition”, but the official policies and legislation tend to rely on old-fashioned 
identity categories. However, a trend towards cultural focus can be seen both in sense of 
commodity and external recognition, which can be an asset in the future. (Schweitzer, et al., 
2014). 
Increased access and a longer navigation season have already had an impact on Arctic 
shipping and transportation. There are two major sea routes in the Arctic: the Northwest 
Passage (NWP) at the American side and the Northeast Passage (NEP) at the Eurasian side 
of the Arctic (see Figure 1). The Northern Sea Route (NSR), is a shipping line in the NEP, 
from the port of Dudinka to Murmansk. (AMSA, 2009).  
In the NSR, an increase in the ship size and a change in the shipping season has been observed 
(PAME, 2013). Overall, Arctic shipping activities have increased since 2000 partly due to 
reduced sea ice; hence a growing interest in future ice conditions exists (Rogers, et al. 2013). 
Northern Sea Route Information Office (2016) provides transit statistics to NSR since 2011: 
41 vessels entered NSR in 2011, 46 in 2012, 71 in 2013 and 53 in 2014 (of which 31 travelled 
the entire length). In 2013, the shipping season in the NSR lasted for 154 days and a total of 
49 vessels transported 1.35 million tons of cargo, mainly oil products (911 000 tons = 67 % 
of the total cargo). 203 000 tons of iron ore (15 %) and some coal (5.5 %) and general cargo 
(7.4 %) were also carried. Of the total of 71 entries to NSR, only 41 vessels travelled the 
entire length. (Humpert, 2014). 
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Figure 1. Sea routes in the Arctic. (AMSA, 2009). 
The United States Geological Survey (2008) estimates the total amount of undiscovered 
petroleum resources in the Arctic at about 413 billion barrels of oil equivalent (bboe); 134 
oil and 279 gas (Lindholt & Glomsrod, 2011). Over 70 % of the undiscovered oil reserves 
are estimated to occur in 5 provinces: Arctic Alaska, the Amerasia Basin, the East Greenland 
Rift Basins, the East Barents Basins, and in West Greenland-East Canada, whereas the gas 
reserves occur in 3 provinces: the West Siberian Basin, the East Barents Basin, and Arctic 
Alaska. 84 % of the resources occur offshore (USGS, 2008). 
Harsem et al. (2011) conclude that Arctic oil and gas production is dependent on a complex 
set of variables including three key characteristics. First, the Arctic environment is difficult 
to operate in. Long term plans and predictions become difficult to make under a changing 
climate where historical data might not support cost effective investment decisions in the 
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future. Second, extreme conditions imply high production costs compared to other regions. 
Hence, a sudden shift in price or demand may have a great effect on Arctic production. Third, 
high costs drive governments to take the lead, which might lead to colliding policies across 
different political levels. 
The Arctic environment consists of fragile marine and terrestrial ecosystems, which are under 
pressure due to human influence. Because of air and water circulation patterns, local climates 
in Eurasian Arctic and American side of the Arctic differ, but in general the Arctic has cold 
winters, cool summers and low humidity (CAFF, 2001). Over the past decades, Arctic 
climate has been warming rapidly and the average temperature has increased twice the rate 
compared to rest of the world (ACIA, 2004). Still, climate creates harsh conditions for species 
to survive. Permafrost is an important element in the Eurasian Arctic land areas, which are 
mainly covered by taiga, forest tundra and tundra, and even polar deserts in the Arctic Ocean 
islands (CAFF, 2001). For instance, the Arctic vegetation is a home for reindeers, caribous, 
mountain hares and various birds. Arctic fish populations, marine mammals such as walruses 
and seals, and seabirds are prominent elements of Arctic marine ecosystems (PAME, 2013), 
but the diversity, ranges and distribution of populations are projected to change with 
proceeding climate change (ACIA, 2004).  
2.2 The Arctic in the future? 
The expected rapid environmental changes and potential geopolitical and economic 
significance have encouraged many authors and organizations to anticipate, predict or 
analyse the trends and future development of the Arctic region. Some concentrate on the key 
shaping forces while others go further into constructing conditional scenarios for the area as 
a whole or for certain activities. 
One exercise identifying the key trends in the area is the Megatrends report published by the 
Nordic Council of Ministers (Nordregio, 2011). It draws attention to the megatrends that 
shape the changes in the Arctic, but it also goes further in discussing the wishes and priorities 
of Arctic societies and secure development. The report presents nine overarching megatrends 
affecting all development in the Arctic: 
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1. “Increased urbanisation – a global trend also including the Arctic” 
2. “Demographic challenges – the old stay while the young leave” 
3. “Continued dependency on transfers [from royalties and governments] and the 
exploitation of natural resources will continue to dominate the Arctic economies” 
4. “Continued pollution and ongoing climate change will have a significant impact on 
the nature and environment of the Arctic” 
5. “The Arctic needs to generate more Human Capital by investing more in its people” 
6. “Changes in the nature of interaction between the public and private spheres will 
impact development” 
7. “Renewable energy will contribute to a ‘greening’ of the economy” 
8. “Increased accessibility provide opportunities as well as new risks” 
9. “The Arctic as a new player in the global game” 
Due to the nature of the report, some of the megatrends seem to have a rather political tone. 
Furthermore, these megatrends do not describe scenarios as such but are meant to pave way 
for more detailed foresight analysis and scenario construction. However, we consider these 
as suitable basis for our work. 
Table 1 lists selected socio-economic scenarios for the Arctic areas. Many of these have a 
special emphasis on the maritime industry, energy issues and environmental management. 
For instance, the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) created 
scenarios for Arctic marine navigation in 2050 in two workshops during 2007. The 60 
workshop participants agreed that governance and resources & trade are the most critical 
among the 120 uncertainties identified. These two critical uncertainties form the axes of the 
AMSA scenario matrix (Figure 2). 
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Table 1. Summary of literature of socio-economic scenarios in the Arctic 
Reference Subject of 
scenarios 
(industry) 
Key drivers or 
variables 
Scenario 
development 
method 
Geograph
ic 
coverage 
Time 
horizo
n 
AMSA 
(2009) 
Arctic marine 
navigation 
Development of 
Arctic natural 
resources 
(hydrocarbons, 
hard minerals and 
fisheries); 
Regional trade 
Expert 
workshop 
The Arctic 2050 
Loe et al. 
(2014) 
Arctic 
business 
(various 
sectors) 
Energy 
developments; 
Climate change; 
Environmental 
regulation; 
China’s growth; 
Russian domestic 
policies; 
International 
relations; Arctic 
cool3; 
Communication; 
Technology 
Workshops 
and in-depth 
interviews 
with business 
leaders and 
Arctic 
experts 
The Arctic 2020 
Perrels et 
al. (2014) 
Container 
shipping 
Economic growth Modelling 
exercise 
(World 
Container 
Model) 
Northern 
Sea Route 
2040 
Cavalieri et 
al. (2010) 
EU’s 
environmenta
l footprint 
Climate change; 
Governance 
Expert 
workshop 
The Arctic 2030 
 
                                                          
 
3 Arctic cool refers to perceptions of Arctic in the eyes of the public. 
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Figure 2. Scenario matrix for the AMSA scenarios for maritime industry. Modified from 
AMSA (2009). 
Loe et al. (2014) present three scenarios for Arctic business towards 2020. The scenarios 
cover shipping, petroleum, mining and seafood industries, and business development 
opportunities in the Arctic. The first scenario is driven by oil demand, the second by 
adaptation to alternative energy sources and the third by increased regionalism. While the 
AMSA (2009) scenarios focus on maritime industry in general, the scenarios by Loe et al. 
(2014) focus on business activities. However, these scenarios have a rather short time horizon 
compared to the AMSA (2009) scenarios. 
A more sector-specific scenario exercise was conducted as part of the FP7 ToPDAd project 
(Perrels, et al., 2014). In the “Arctic Shipping case - theme 3” in Perrels et al., 2014, container 
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shipping on the NSR with a Polar Class 6 (PC-6) or Polar Class 7 (PC-7)4 ship was compared 
to container shipping via the Suez Canal. PC-6 and PC-7 entail low cost adaptation to the 
existing container vessels (Perrels, et al., 2014). Container shipping constitutes more than 50 
% (in value) of the maritime market (UNCTAD, 2012), and its share is growing. While 
referring to Bussiere and Schnatz (2006), the ToPDAd study assumes that the container based 
trade flows between Europe and East Asia will be 2 to 4 times larger in 2040 as compared to 
2010-2011. From East Asia (Tokio, Pusan, Shanghai) the NSR is 10% to 30% shorter than 
the route via the Suez Canal. This means fuel savings and — depending on the ice conditions 
— time savings. Owing to the time saving potential, the NSR seems most competitive in the 
shipping of vehicles, machinery and other manufactured goods that take a 97% share of all 
container shipping, as these goods have a high value of time. In the most optimistic estimate 
(reached in the absence of large investments and high bunker fuel prices) the NSR traffic 
might expand up to 2.5 million TEU’s (Twenty-foot equivalent unit). (Perrels, et al., 2014) 
The Polar class ships have higher capital cost than normal ocean going ships and the size of 
ships using NSR is limited to 3800 TEU; the newest container ships have quadruple and even 
more capacity. The PC-6 and PC-7 ships’ polar advantage can only be used from June – 
October. The rest of the year the ships need to use the Suez Canal at a cost disadvantage 
compared to standard container ships. As a consequence, the resulting container market niche 
for the NSR is quite sensitive to factors outside the control of the shipping companies and of 
the NSR manager (Russia), such as fuel prices and Suez Canal capacity and charges. 
Furthermore, enhancement of the Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR), could add further 
competition to the NSR, as it can offer transport times of 15-25 days. As a result the more 
plausible projections for container shipping via the NSR up to around 2040 stay below the 1 
million TEU per year. (Perrels, et al., 2014). 
Due to the factors mentioned above, there seems to be little chance that the NSR becomes 
competitive year-round by 2040 (Perrels, et al., 2014). This is confirmed in Rogers et al. 
                                                          
 
4 PC 7 vessel can operate summer and autumn in thin first-year ice, which may also include 
old ice, and it is the lowest type of polar class vessels (IACS, 2011). 
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(2013), which suggests that ice cover is reduced in the key access routes in the Arctic all the 
way through 2100 and the season for marine operations will lengthen by 1-3 months. Yet, 
unassisted access for the PC-7 vessel would occur only in the latter half of the century. 
The EU Arctic Footprint –project (Cavalieri, et al., 2010) has created three scenarios for 
analysing the effectiveness of environmental and other policies in the Arctic in 2030. The 
scenarios are labelled Race for Resources, Business as Usual (BAU) and Eased by Efficiency. 
The scenario framework relies on four key parameters; climate change, efficacy of 
management of environmental pressures, economic growth in the EU, efficiency of resource 
use of EU actors, and different assumption of their state.  
As shown by the examples above, Arctic development is tightly connected to the global 
climatic and socio-economic changes. Perhaps the most cited global climate scenarios are 
those developed for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The current 
scenario framework includes three components: Representative Concentration Pathways 
(RCPs) (van Vuuren, et al., 2011), Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (O´Neill, et al., 
2014) and Shared Climate Policy Assumptions (SPAs) (Kriegler, et al., 2014). The four RCPs 
represent the changes in the greenhouse gas emissions, radiative forcing and climate and the 
five SSPs represent possible socio-economic development, such as population and economic 
productivity. SPAs refer to policies and measures that are needed to tie a certain socio-
economic development into certain emission pathway; unlike RCPs and SSPs, there exists 
no predetermined set of SPAs (O´Neill, et al., 2014). Hence, SPAs could be considered as 
the global political attitude or will that is required to reach the climate target. The 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, 2015; IIASA, 2014) and 
Adaptation Actions for A Changing Arctic (AACA, 2016) in a project lead by AMAP, are 
currently developing Arctic scenarios under the RCP/SSP framework. At the moment in the 
TWASE project, the RCP/SSP framework is used as a general backdrop for the scenario 
development, but they have not been explicitly used behind the scenarios due to the interest 
toward aspects beyond the RCP/SSP framework. 
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2.3 Drivers of the Arctic change in PESTLE framework 
Existing scenarios provide background for what has been considered as the key drivers and 
their trends in the Arctic. Complementing the top-down type of scenario literature overview 
with a bottom-up analysis, we searched for sources discussing individual drivers of the Arctic 
development. To categorise these drivers, the so called PESTLE5 (Political, Economic, 
Social, Technological, Legal, Environmental) framework was used. This framework was 
later emphasised during the exchange with the workshop participants to ensure that the full 
range of factors in the development of the Arctic is considered. However, for that purpose 
the framework was slightly simplified by merging political and legal drivers, thereby the 
framework was a so-called PESTE framework.  
2.3.1 Political  
Geopolitics and power relations of the Arctic countries and others interested in the Arctic 
play a key role in Arctic development, as the Arctic countries already have competing 
interests concerning Arctic resources (Aaltola, et al., 2014). International cooperation and 
Arctic treaties create the rules of the game in the Eurasian Arctic, both in resource extraction 
and exploration, but also in shipping and other activities. Maritime boundaries that are 
diplomatically resolved reduce uncertainty in border areas and enable, for example, resource 
exploration (Andrew, 2014). Offshore petroleum and other resources are mainly governed 
by the states themselves, unlike shipping that is under international governance (PAME, 
2013). 
When it comes to energy and extractive resource issues, many countries emphasise their 
territorial presence in a resource abundant area. Sovereignty is found to be a major driver for 
exploring new resources in the Arctic, and therefore national interests shape development 
(Andrew, 2014). Another driver for Arctic resource exploration is the national interest to 
                                                          
 
5 https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_09.htm 
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reduce dependence especially on energy imports. When fossil fuel reserves become more 
accessible, nations are tempted to utilize them (Andrew, 2014). 
Global and national climate policies also shape the Arctic development by affecting the 
strictness of global emission pathway, which eventually has an impact on ice cover. 
According to Andrew (2014), Arctic shipping may potentially displace transit shipping 
elsewhere because of the reduced fuel consumption and expectation of reduced climate 
impacts. Climate policy may even incentivise Arctic shipping over other routes (Andrew, 
2014). Climate agreements and regulations have political significance in developing the 
hydrocarbon sector in the Arctic as well (Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic, 
2014). 
2.3.2 Economic  
The future of the Arctic and relevant economic activities are shaped by global economic 
development. For instance, the development of the shipping industry is driven by oil and iron 
ore prices, and oil and gas exploration and exploitation are driven by oil and gas prices and 
energy demand. The future energy supply systems need to respond to the increased demand 
for energy and electricity in the changing climatic conditions. The development of energy 
systems has an impact on the Arctic indirectly through climate change and directly through 
the exploration of resources. (Harsem, et al., 2011) 
Arctic petroleum supply can be highly sensitive to development of petroleum prices 
(Lindholt & Glomsrod, 2011). High prices are a result of increasing demand for energy and 
declining production from existing conventional fields (Andrew, 2014). Increased demand 
for oil and gas will contribute to making previously marginal or unviable deposits 
competitive and exploitable in economic terms (Harsem, et al., 2011).  
Historically, oil prices have been fluctuating and changing. A record oil price was reached in 
early 2008 (Figure 3). In general, crude oil prices may swing due to geopolitical events, 
changes in demand and supply (by OPEC and non-OPEC countries) and the emergence of 
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new stocks6. However, peaks in oil prices have not been consistently followed by an increase 
in the number of licences issued by governments, seismic data acquisition, drilling and oil 
production because a complex relationship exists between all these factors (Crandall & 
Thurston, 2010). 
 
Figure 3. The development of crude oil price 1983-2014 (EIA, 2014b). 
For the time being, the Arctic has more importance in supplying gas than oil. If the oil price 
is relatively high and producers acquire access, Arctic may gain importance as a global oil 
producer. 70% of undiscovered petroleum in the Arctic is natural gas, but the Arctic’s share 
of global production is likely to decline by 2050 because of the new shale gas and oil sands 
reserves for example in Canada and USA (Lindholt & Glomsrod, 2011). U.S. Energy 
Information Administration projects that the crude oil price will be 92.93$ in 2020, 104.90$ 
in 2025, 114.69 in 2030, 125.59 in 2035 and 137.63$ in 2040 (EIA, 2014a). International 
                                                          
 
6 http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm 
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Energy Agency in turn estimates that the Arctic resources could be exploited at a cost of 35-
100$ per barrel (IEA, 2008). 
Petroleum production in the Arctic faces harsh weather conditions and high costs compared 
to other regions. Offshore and remote areas add to the challenges due to the lack of 
transportation infrastructure (Lindholt & Glomsrod, 2011). Large scale production plants 
have capital, technological and labour needs that are often brought from outside the Arctic, 
implying that much of the income that projects generate flow out of the region (Huskey, et 
al., 2014).  
The oil price is one determining factor in the Arctic oil and gas exploration but it certainly is 
not the only one. Long-term price projection is important, because the discovery and 
exploration activities in the Arctic require a great deal of time (building infrastructure, ports, 
tankers etc.). Also even one large discovery or the depletion of old reserves may be drivers 
for further exploration. Trans-Alaska Pipeline System will potentially face prohibitive refit 
costs if certain threshold values of the throughput are reached (200000 barrels per day is 
technological limit and 400000 barrels per day economical limit), which also drives the 
exploration. In addition, incentives and public acceptance have an influence on exploration. 
(AMAP, 2010). 
The shipping industry in the Arctic is also affected by the global economy, and, for example, 
changes in oil and iron ore prices. Shipping decisions are affected by the fee for the use of 
NSR and fuel costs (Perrels, et al., 2014). Furthermore, Arctic shipping routes may have 
reduced costs compared to other competing routes, which may attract shipping (Andrew, 
2014).  
According to Buixade Farre et al. (2014), NEP has the most potential of the Arctic shipping 
routes to enable economic activity in the area and shipping related to extraction of resources 
has the most immediate potential for expanding the activities along the route. More 
specifically, Lasserre and Pelletier (2011) looked only at NSR and found that the bulk sector 
(oil, gas and minerals), which does not rely on schedules so heavily, and vessels servicing 
local communities would benefit from the route. Container ships, on the other hand, rely on 
strict schedules, which might be difficult to hold in Arctic waters unlike the route via Suez 
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Canal. Hence, the Arctic conditions create challenges to the container sector. (Buixade Farre, 
et al., 2014). A theoretical potential assuming that the NSR is similar to Suez route in all 
ways but in distance, the trade volume of NSR could account a little less than 4 % of world 
trade (Morgenroth, 2014). 
Despite the theoretical potential, there are many restricting factors:  
 the route bathymetry is low restricting the size of cargo, (50 000 deadweight tons, or 
2500-4500 TEU’s) (Buixade Farre, et al., 2014);  
 new routes have difficulty being established due to competition structure of the 
industry, as found in a survey among shipping companies (Lasserre & Pelletier, 
2011); 
 weather conditions, drifting ice and icebergs still cause risks (Perrels, et al., 2014; 
Lasserre & Pelletier, 2011); 
 navigation aid and porting facilities are limited (Perrels, et al., 2014; Lasserre & 
Pelletier, 2011);  
 other competing routes (e.g. Suez Canal) still hold a competitive advantage. They 
offer greater vessel capacity, predictability and access to multiple markets and ports 
offering maintenance and support. (Buixade Farre, et al., 2014). 
In theory, NEP could save about 40 % of sailing distance from Asia to Europe. However, 
that does not correspond to equal savings in costs. For example, higher building costs for ice-
classed ships, non-regularity and slower speeds, navigation difficulties and greater risks 
hinder the growth of shipping in the Arctic. From a single user’s perspective, navigable time 
of the NEP, Russian NSR fees and bunker prices have the largest influence on the use of 
NEP, and competitiveness of NEP correlates with the ice-breaking fees. (Liu & Kronbak, 
2010). 
Tourism can also be seen as an economic driver for Arctic development. Yet, it is regarded 
as a benign development alternative compared to resource exploration and extraction (Hall 
& Saarinen, 2010). Major obstacles influencing future tourism in the Arctic are physical 
access, tourists’ ability to pay, time and cost that is associated with traveling to remote areas, 
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capacity and availability of infrastructure, environmental conditions and jurisdictional 
restraints (AMSA, 2009).  
2.3.3 Social  
The population projections in different parts of the Arctic region vary (see Figure 4). The 
societal development is to large extent driven by interlinked drivers of migration both in and 
out of the area (Andrew, 2014), increased urbanisation and demographic structure 
(Nordregio, 2011).  
 
Figure 4. Projections for Arctic population by region in 2010, 2020 and 2030 (Heleniak & 
Bogoyalensky, 2014). 
Despite the rather small population, demography is one key issue in societal development. 
Ageing of the population, on the one hand, and the decreasing youth, on the other hand, are 
important factors for the development of Arctic communities (Heleniak & Bogoyalensky, 
2014). Urbanization is a global megatrend that is also seen in the Arctic. Especially the young 
migrate from the region due to, for example, the lack of education opportunities but the old 
remain (Nordregio, 2011). This has naturally implications for the service needs of Arctic 
societies.  
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Indigenous populations in the Arctic are, in general, in an earlier stage of demographic 
transition than non-Indigenous populations since many Indigenous populations have 
relatively young age structure (meaning there are relatively more young people than old 
people). Consequently, Indigenous peoples tend to make up an increasing share of the 
population (Heleniak & Bogoyalensky, 2014). However, this development varies between 
regions. 
2.3.4 Technological 
Technological advancements in all sectors and scales shape the development. In the Arctic, 
improved technologies regarding hydrocarbon production, shipping and transportation 
especially affect the future development (Andrew, 2014). For instance, the increase of 
interest in oil and gas activities in Arctic waters in the past years was also instigated by 
developments in offshore drilling technology and sea ice retention (PAME, 2013). The 
characteristics of the vessel (e.g. its carrying capacity and Polar Class7) are also important in 
Arctic waters. Innovations in shipbuilding technology play a part in the potential increase of 
Arctic container shipping (Perrels, et al., 2014). Particularly important is the vessel’s ability 
to break the ice and make both narrow and wide channels. An example of such technology, 
the oblique icebreaker concept, has been developed in the mid 1990’s by Aker Arctic 
(Hovilainen, et al., 2014).  
Navigation technology is another factor affecting the extent of offshore activities and 
willingness to exploit the potentially shorter Arctic routes. Enhancements in weather and ice 
forecasting and nautical charts to aid navigation should also be of interest to Arctic states and 
individual Arctic mariners can receive this detailed and location-specific information when 
operating the sea (PAME, 2013). Navigation and extent of sea ice go hand in hand, but 
economics, infrastructure, bathymetry and weather have also a role in navigation related 
decision-making (Stephenson, et al., 2013). Hence, development or under-development of 
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navigation technology and other supporting technologies and information does shape the 
scale of shipping and transportation activities in the Arctic.  
Recently, monitoring and surveillance of ship traffic in the Arctic Ocean has progressed. 
Automatic identification systems for collision avoidance required by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO; a UN agency), ground-based radars and satellite tracking of 
ships provide information on shipping routes, traffic and vessels (PAME, 2013). Utilizing 
and further developing satellite-based technology would enable safer passage. There are 
public and private plans to increase satellite coverage over the Arctic, improving 
communications, air and marine traffic management and environmental observations (Iceye 
Oy, 2015; Norwegian Space Center, 2015; Magnuson, 2014; Zeppenfeldt, 2009). 
Autonomous airships have also been proposed as another technological solution to improve 
these services, as well as hauling cargo (Sarkadi, 2012). 
2.3.5 Legal  
There are three federal states and five unitary states (including Greenland and Faroe Islands, 
the autonomous territories of Denmark) in the Arctic; each possessing their own formal legal 
systems. Furthermore, global and regional domains of international law apply in the Arctic 
and the European Union (EU) member countries and signatories of European Economic Area 
Agreement are committed to comply with the regulations of the EU. Customary norms of 
Indigenous peoples are less formal than legal systems, but in recent decades states have 
started to account for these traditional norms, habits and values in national and regional 
legislation. (Bankes et al., 2014). 
In general, domestic laws have offered increased language rights to Indigenous peoples but 
the legislators have been reluctant to recognize their land ownership rights. However, 
international instruments that address the rights of Indigenous peoples are continuously being 
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elaborated. Some examples of this type of development are the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ILO Convention 1698. (Bankes et al., 2014) 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is of primary importance 
in the Arctic because of the vast maritime area the Arctic holds and the historical accessibility 
to the area. Land areas form the basis for national maritime zones but overlapping claims 
prevail in the crossroads of continents and countries. The claims are continuously under 
disputes, but the current development shows a trend towards delimitation (Bankes et al., 
2014). 
In addition to the territorial aspects, there are also an increasing amount of regulations 
guiding activities in Arctic waters. The Polar Code, a mandatory international code issued by 
IMO for ships operating in the Arctic and Antarctic waters has been adopted and will enter 
into force in 2017. The Polar Code applies to passenger and cargo ships above 500 tons gross 
tonnage and concerns a range of design, construction, equipment, operational, training, 
search and rescue, and environmental protection matters. The code will be legally binding 
for vessels operating in the Arctic. (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 84). Even though IMO is responsible 
for setting technology standards for ships operating in the Arctic, individual states can impose 
stricter standards (Buixade Farre, et al., 2014). High safety levels and strict standards help to 
avoid potential risks and adverse effects to the Arctic marine environment (PAME, 2013). 
2.3.6 Environmental 
Climate change, a global phenomenon that is changing the Earth system and societies, is 
shaping the Arctic environment by melting the sea ice cover, thereby creating both 
opportunities and threats to society and economic activities. The Arctic ecosystems have 
already experienced changes due to climate change, for example, 
 warming of surface-water in mid and high latitudes,  
                                                          
 
8 International Labor Organization’s Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries 
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 decrease of the sea ice cover, 
 spatial shifts of fish populations,  
 earlier phytoplankton bloom, and 
 changes in land cover (Larsen, et al., 2014). 
These will drive changes in the economy as well. According to the Arctic Human 
Development Report (2014), the three pillars of the Arctic economy are large scale resource 
production, traditional and small scale resource production, and transfers from governments 
(public sector jobs, provision of services, direct payments to residents) (Larsen & Fondahl, 
2014b). Sectors that exploit natural resources, such as agriculture, forestry and fisheries have 
already undergone changes relating to the timing of activities, management of the resource 
base and productivity. The transport sector has also benefited from climate change because 
navigation season is longer due to the decreased sea ice cover. As suggested in Mokhov & 
Khon (2008), ice free conditions have increased by 22 days in NSR between 1979-1988 and 
1998-2007. By the end of the 21st century, NSR may be open for navigation about 4.5 months 
a year. In general, accessibility to the Arctic is the major environmental driver of Arctic 
development (Andrew, 2014). 
Greater marine access and longer navigation seasons are expected due to the retreat of Arctic 
sea ice (PAME, 2013), which is caused by the proceeding climate change. The length of the 
navigation season depends on the timing, extent and thickness of the Arctic sea ice cover, 
which are also important from the shipping and transportation perspective (Buixade Farre, et 
al., 2014). 
Overall, climate change and the changing Arctic environment can make offshore exploration, 
drilling and production of hydrocarbons easier. However, activities may also become more 
difficult, as experienced in recent years as the ice cover behaviour has become less 
predictable. This expectedly causes both risks and opportunities to the oil and gas industry 
(Harsem, et al., 2011). 
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3 The Scenario Construction Methodology 
The scenario construction was completed in four major phases (Figure 5). The literature 
review (Chapter 2), pre-survey and workshop provided input to the final scenario 
construction work, conducted by the project team, and resulted in the final scenario 
narratives. This Chapter describes the pre-survey, workshop and restructuring and analysing 
processes. 
 
Figure 5. Process of scenario construction. 
3.1 Pre-survey 
Before the workshop, the participants were asked to rank a set of global and local drivers 
guiding Arctic development based on their perceived importance. The majority of the drivers 
were pre-defined based on literature (see Section 2.3). Some drivers were chosen based on 
the TWASE research plan and on expert opinions9, and some impacts of the drivers were 
also added to the list (livelihoods of Indigenous peoples). Table 2 shows the list of drivers 
and impacts used in the pre-survey. The purpose of the pre-survey was also to collect 
background information about the expected participants. 
 
                                                          
 
9 Discussions with FMI research professors Adriaan Perrels and Timo Vihma (leader of 
TWASE project). 
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Table 2. List of the factors used in the pre-survey. 
Factor Reference 
Climate change Andrew (2014) (on accessibility) 
Level of international co-operation Modified from Aaltola et al. (2014) 
and Andrew 2014 
Environmental awareness Expert opinion 
Global demand for fossil fuels Harsem et al. (2011); Andrew (2014) 
Global climate policy Modified from Andrew (2014) and 
Strategic Assessment of Development 
of the Arctic (2014) 
Global economy Harsem et al. (2011) 
Global demand of minerals Modified from Andrew (2014) 
Fossil fuel price levels in global market Harsem et al. (2011); Lindholt & 
Glomsrod (2011) 
Mineral price levels in global market Andrew (2014); Harsem et al. (2011) 
Development of Arctic engineering (including 
control of extreme conditions) 
Modified from UNCTAD (2014) 
(IMO Polar Code) 
Development/coverage/distribution of 
infrastructure 
Modified from Lindholt & Glomsrod 
(2011) 
Competitiveness of the Northern Sea Route 
compared to other trade routes 
Modified from Andrew (2014); 
Morgenroth (2014); Liu & Kronbak 
(2010) 
Arctic treaties (navigation and environmental) Modified from PAME (2013) 
Extreme natural conditions and their variability Modified from Andrew (2014) 
Developments in shipbuilding technology and 
winter navigation technology 
Modified form Andrew (2014); 
Stephenson et al. (2013); Perrels et al. 
(2014) 
International co-operation in the Arctic Aaltola et al. (2014); Andrew (2014) 
Minimizing risks of natural and manmade hazards Modified from PAME (2013) 
Development in satellite technology Expert opinion 
Geopolitical situation (tense vs. cooperative) Aaltola et al. (2014) 
Utilization and accessibility of mineral resources Modified from AMAP (2010) 
National climate policy Modified from Andrew (2014) and 
Strategic Assessment of Development 
of the Arctic (2014) 
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Common Arctic security policy Based on expert opinion 
Tourism Modified from AMSA (2009) 
Land rights (not including the off-shore locations) Based on expert opinion 
Utilization and accessibility of fossil fuel reserves Modified from Harsem et al. (2011); 
Lindholt & Glomsrod (2011); AMAP 
(2010) 
Emphasizing territorial presence (e.g. by keeping 
areas populated) 
Modified from Andrew (2014) 
(sovereignty and autonomy of 
resources) 
Marine fisheries Modified from Larsen et al. (2014) 
Livelihoods of Indigenous peoples Modified from Larsen et al. (2014) 
(an impact) 
Certification of Arctic products and services 
(greentech and cleantech) 
Expert opinion 
 
Following the logic used in Andrew (2014), the drivers were divided into local and global 
drivers in order to separate the drivers emerging from within the Arctic and from global 
development. The results of the pre-survey are shown in Figure 6 for global drivers and Table 
3 for local drivers. The drivers are listed in order of their perceived importance. The pre-
survey results were presented in the workshop and used as a starting point for the workshop 
activities. Section 3.3.2 explains how the pre-survey is incorporated in the final scenarios.  
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Figure 6. Global drivers identified in the pre-survey in the order of importance. 10 
  
                                                          
 
10 Map credit to: http://ewgukraine.wikispaces.com/Earth+Day. Texts added. 
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Table 3. Local drivers identified in the pre-survey in the order of importance. 
Local drivers  
Development of Arctic engineering (including control of extreme 
conditions) 
Development/coverage/distribution of infrastructure 
Competitiveness of the Northern Sea Route compared to other trade 
routes 
Arctic treaties (navigation and environmental) 
Extreme natural conditions and their variability 
Developments in shipbuilding technology and winter navigation 
technology 
International co-operation in the Arctic 
Minimizing risks of natural and manmade hazards 
Development in satellite technology 
Geopolitical situation (tense vs. cooperative) 
Utilization and accessibility of mineral resources 
National climate policy 
Common Arctic security policy 
Tourism 
Land rights (not including the off-shore locations) 
Utilization and accessibility of fossil fuel reserves 
Emphasizing territorial presence (e.g. by keeping areas populated) 
Marine fisheries 
Livelihoods of Indigenous peoples 
Certification of Arctic products and services (greentech and 
cleantech) 
3.2 Workshop 
3.2.1 Aim and Objectives  
The purpose of the workshop was to collect expert input for scenario construction for the 
Eurasian Arctic by 2040 with the aim to collect the framework (“skeleton”) for the socio-
economic scenarios and to start putting “flesh on the bones” for the detailed scenario 
description with innovative workshop methods/techniques. A scenario development toolkit 
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described in Wulf, Brands and Meissner (2010ab-2011ab) gave the inspiration for the 
approach and methods used.  
The specific objectives of the workshop were to 
 Identify factors that critically affect Eurasian Arctic development (day 1) 
 Understand the causes and effects of development trends (day 1 and 2) 
 Develop preliminary socio-economic scenarios for the Eurasian Arctic by 2040 (day 
2) 
The key sectors relevant for scenario-building emphasized during the workshop were natural 
resource extraction, tourism and shipping. These sectors were the primary focus of the 
workshop but any issues brought up or suggested by the workshop participants were also 
discussed.  
Twelve experts participated in the workshop; of which five were from outside the Finnish 
Meteorological Institute. The workshop was facilitated by four members of the project team. 
The techniques used in the workshop were 
 brainstorming and online voting to identify the axes for the scenario matrices, 
 futures wheel to analyse primary and secondary impacts of the development trends, 
and 
 backcasting to develop the preliminary scenario matrix. 
The activities during day 1 were completed in one group and during day 2 the participants 
were divided into two separate groups until a joint discussion, which concluded the 
workshop. During the workshop, the participants were encouraged to frame the analysis of 
various factors and actors that drive the development of the Arctic under the PESTE-
framework: political, economic, socio-cultural, technological and environmental factors and 
actors. 
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3.2.2 Day 1 
Day 1 of the workshop started with the introduction to the TWASE project given by the 
project coordinator. The introduction was followed by general information about the 
workshop and a presentation on the pre-survey results, which was used as a starting point for 
the two-day discussion.  
Activity 1: Brainstorming 
The first activity of the workshop was to identify relevant factors and actors that have an 
impact on the development of the Eurasian Arctic by 2040. This was done in a brainstorming 
session followed by facilitated discussion. The factors were defined as development trends 
or processes that influence the activities or the environment in the Eurasian Arctic in some 
way. The actors were defined as organizations or parties that can actively influence or have 
a stake in the Arctic development. The PESTE-framework played a key role in this activity. 
The results of the brainstorming were then clustered under themes. The clustering was done 
by the facilitators with active participation and commenting from the workshop participants. 
Emerging themes were: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local 
inhabitants/communities, consumers, economics, business, resources, shipping, energy, 
technology, climate change, policy issues, non-Arctic interests, and surprises. These themes 
include both factors and actors. 
Activity 2: Online voting, heat map and axis formation 
During the brainstorming session, the project team identified important development trends, 
which arose from the discussions. These development trends were formulated by the project 
team into one or two statements for each actor and factor cluster themes and were used in the 
next step. The statements describe a possible development trend of each cluster identified 
during the brainstorming (Table 4). The idea was to formulate them into a declarative form 
to enable the voting process. The purpose of the statements was to find out and measure how 
the participants perceive the impact of the possible development trends or events on the 
Arctic by 2040 and the likelihood and related uncertainty of each trend or event. 
29 
 
Table 4. Statements formulated by the project team. 
Actor / Factor Statement: 
Development trend of the actor/factor 
ENV. NGOs Rise of environmental awareness 
LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES 
Increase in political power of local 
communities 
CONSUMERS Increase in Arctic tourism 
ECONOMICS Rise of Asian economies 
BUSINESS Increase in business activities in the Arctic 
RESOURCES Increased demand of non-fossil resources 
SHIPPING Major increase in Arctic shipping 
ENERGY Shift to post-petroleum age 
TECHNOLOGY Major improvements in (Arctic) technologies 
CLIMATE CHANGE Ice cover continues to retreat rapidly 
POLICY ISSUES Arctic treaties hold 
Tightening of global CC (climate change) 
policy 
NON-ARCTIC 
INTEREST 
Rise of global interest towards the Arctic 
SURPRISES Major environmental incident 
Destabilization of geopolitics in the area 
 
The impact and uncertainty/likelihood of the statements were determined by anonymous 
online voting by using the PollEverywhere software11, which the participants used with their 
mobile phones or computers. Each statement was first voted according to its impact on a five 
point scale and then according to its likelihood and uncertainty on a seven point scale. Before 
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and after each voting round, a short discussion was facilitated to make sure all the participants 
had a shared understanding of the statement and that everyone had been able to vote as they 
wanted. 
The voting resulted in a heat map (see Figure 7), which shows the collective perception on 
the impact and uncertainty/likelihood of each trend or event. The horizontal axis describes 
the likelihood and certainty of the occurrence of the statements. The statements considered 
most certainly likely are on the right and most certainly unlikely on the left – the more 
perceived uncertainty there was, the closer to the centre the statement is. It should be noted 
that in this system, there are two sources for the perceived uncertainty: either the participants’ 
views separated so that others considered a trend likely and other unlikely, or then many 
participants considered the trend to be uncertain. The vertical axis describes the impact of 
the statement on Arctic by 2040, ranging from low impact (at the lower end of the axis) to 
high impact (at the upper end of the axis). 
The results of the heat map can be used to categorize the trends or events into “predetermined 
trends”, “critical uncertainties” and “secondary elements”. Predetermined trends will most 
likely happen and have a great impact on the Arctic. Critical uncertainties are those that have 
a high impact on the Arctic development by 2040, but their occurrence is highly uncertain. 
Secondary elements may be used for further differentiation in final scenario narratives but 
they are not important in developing the scenario frames. Eventually, the critical uncertainties 
form the basis of the choice for the axes in the scenario matrix. 
31 
 
 
Figure 7. Heat map of the voting results. The horizontal axis corresponds with certainty and 
likelihood: the closer a point is to the centre, the more uncertain the trend is. Towards the 
borders, the trends are considered either more likely (to the right) or unlikely (to the left). 
Vertical axis corresponds to the estimated impact of the trend to the Arctic area. The 
likelihood was voted on a seven point scale and the impact on a five point scale. 
The heat map shows, for instance, that the participants assigned relatively high certainty to 
the Arctic ice cover continues to retreat rapidly (2) and that it has the highest impact on 
Arctic development. Therefore, this can be considered a predetermined trend. The same goes 
for the major improvements in (Arctic) technologies (12), which was rated as having a 
slightly smaller impact, but with a bit higher certainty. A shift to post-petroleum age (13) and 
a major increase in Arctic shipping (14) also have a high impact on the Arctic, but were 
considered more uncertain. Increased demand for non-fossil resources (1) is also considered 
to have more uncertainty yet quite high impact. The most uncertain events were considered 
to be tightening of global climate change policy (5) and increase in political power of local 
communities (3). The former was considered to have quite a high impact on the Arctic and 
the latter medium impact. Rise of Asian economies (4) is very likely but it is not considered 
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to have a very high impact; therefore, it can be considered a secondary element. The most 
critical uncertainties were: Tightening of global CC policy (5), Shift to post-petroleum age 
(13), Major increase in Arctic shipping (14), Major environmental incident (8), Arctic 
treaties hold (6), Destabilisation of geopolitics in the area (7), Increase in business activities 
in the Arctic (11), and Increased demand of non-fossil fuel resources (1). 
The initial purpose of the heat map was to identify the critical uncertainties in order to 
construct the axes for the scenario matrix, as suggested in Wulf et al. (2010b). However, the 
critical uncertainties identified were thematically far apart from each other; therefore, the 
common features of all the statements (not necessarily the critical uncertainties, however) 
were discussed and the first suggested axes for the scenario matrices was 
Institutional/immaterial - material and non-economic - economic. In this matrix, the critical 
uncertainties would fall on the matrix as shown in Figure 8. The first suggestion was further 
elaborated in discussions. 
 
Figure 8. First suggestion for scenario matrix. 
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This received some criticism for instance due to the unclear definition of the dimension 
institutional. The group concluded that there should be more than one scenario matrix with 
two dimensions. This gave rise to two new suggestions: 1) open – closed and public – private; 
and 2) clean – dirty and regulated – unbounded. As the workshop participants considered all 
of these dimensions meaningful and were not able to reach an agreement regarding the 
dimensions for the final scenario matrix — a common step in scenario construction — it was 
decided that these four dimensions would form the basis for the construction of two scenario 
matrices and as background material for the project team in the final scenario construction. 
A third dimension - business as usual - something else – was added to both scenario matrices 
to provoke new ideas and stimulate out of the box–thinking of radically different future 
developments.  
3.2.3 Day 2 
On Day 2, the participants were divided into two groups, which worked separately until the 
final joint discussion.  
Activity 3: Futures wheel 
To obtain a better understanding of the complex feedback-systems and cause and effect -
chains in the Eurasian Arctic, a method called futures wheel12 was used. In the futures wheel, 
an initial, nearly certain predetermined trend is placed in the centre of a board. This can be, 
for instance, a trend which was perceived to have a high impact on the Arctic. First, the 
participants identify primary, first-order impacts of the trend, which is followed by 
identifying second-order impacts.  
The two predetermined trends chosen for this activity were: “Ice cover continues to retreat 
rapidly” and “Rise of global interest towards the Arctic”. These trends were chosen based on 
the voting and the project team’s discussions. The Ice cover retention was voted as the trend 
                                                          
 
12 See description of the Futures Wheel in https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/futures-
wheel.htm.  
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with the highest impact, and the rise of global interest was seen as a driving force to many 
other predetermined trends with high impact.  
After the groups had identified the first and second-order impacts, the futures wheels were 
swopped and the groups were given a chance to comment on the work of the other group. 
The resulting futures wheels are depicted in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The pictures are 
transcribed from flap boards and post-it notes. Primary impacts are shown in green 
background, secondary impacts in yellow background and additions made by the second 
group in blue background. 
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Figure 9. Futures wheel: Rise of global interest in the Arctic. 
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Figure 10. Futures wheel: Ice cover continues to retreat rapidly. 
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Activity 4: Scenario matrix construction 
The last activity of Day 2 was to describe how the world looks like in each of the quadrants 
of the scenario matrix. One group worked with the axes regulated - unbounded and dirty - 
clean, and the other worked with the axes public - private and open - close. Again, the 
participants were instructed to think the world from the point of view of the PESTE-
framework: what political, economic, socio-cultural, technological and environmental 
aspects prevail in the scenarios? This session resulted in preliminary scenario frameworks 
(Figure 11 and Figure 12). In the final discussion, the facilitators presented the scenarios, and 
the differences and similarities of the two different scenario sets were discussed.  
The 4 scenarios in regulated - unbounded and dirty – clean matrix (Figure 11) were created 
by thinking dirty or clean environment as a result of dirty or clean intentions of the regulated 
or unbounded actors. In the dirty and regulated world, the proposed standards in technology 
are not sufficient to meet the criteria for clean environment, regulation is complex and not 
enforced properly with sufficient tax levels. Economic and political decision-making is rather 
short sighted. Military support is utilized in resource use and money flows to military 
technology instead of health or other wellbeing. In the regulated and clean world there is a 
clarity of natural carrying capacity which guides technological development. The Arctic is 
considered as a natural preserve due to social and environmental wellbeing and political will. 
Intergovernmental organisations have active role in supervising Arctic development. In the 
dirty and unbounded world the Arctic states rely on corporations and prioritize economic 
development over environmental concerns. The resources are depleted quickly due to the 
lack of enforcement capability and denial of common property rights. Extensive conflicts or 
even war occurs. Indigenous peoples are treated irresponsibly and people and workforce only 
fly in and out of the Arctic, with no intention to stay. The unbounded and clean world has a 
cleantech boom but a shortage in technology and infrastructure of wellbeing. In general, there 
is sufficient trust between actors and transparency and monitoring in economic activities 
gives more power to the stakeholders.  
The 4 scenarios in open – closed and private – public matrix (Figure 12) were divided among 
the openness and the type of actor taking the initiative in the Arctic development. Openness 
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refers to the region being seen as open for new expansive actions, with possibilities 
overshadowing the limits and barriers of various kinds. A closed Arctic refers to development 
where human activity is maintained at current levels at most or even reduced. Private-
Publicaxis refers to who has the initiative and active role in the development of the Arctic. 
In the public scenarios, the national governments and international organizations set the pace, 
whereas in private scenarios the initiative is on private actors and public measures lag behind. 
The resulting four scenarios were then described to follow these lines, with certain key 
assumptions and related controversies identified. In open-public world the economic activity 
in the Arctic increases within clear regulative boundaries set national and international 
bodies. Incentives and limits are based on environmental and social sustainability. The 
controversy in this development rises from the assumed benevolence of the states; if the 
governing bodies are not committed to sustainable goals, the outcomes can be very different. 
In open-private world the increasing economic activity is based on unregulated market 
incentives. Growth is fast but haphazard and risks, environmental and social problems 
accumulate. The controversy here is tied to subsidies; if all direct and indirect public support 
for large scale utilization ceased, the level of activity might be considerably lower. Thus, 
public initiatives still probably play a role in this world. Public-closed world sees 
development where public actors deliberately limit the activity in the Arctic, resulting in slow 
or non-existent development. The key controversy is whether this is driven by environmental, 
social or military politics. In the private-closed Arctic it is the private sector that decides to 
close the Arctic, although they are not forced to do so. This is either because barriers such as 
the harsh conditions and lack of demand result in decreasing interest or because the 
instruments of environmental protection rise from the private sector in the form of impact 
investing or benevolent investors. 
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Figure 11. Scenario matrix A: unbounded - regulated and dirty - clean. 
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Figure 12. Scenario matrix B: closed- open and private - public. 
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3.3 The way forward 
Due to the fact that the scenario workshop resulted in two separate scenario matrices, the 
final responsibility of the TWASE-scenario narratives was left to the project team. This was 
done in two phases: 1) Restructuring of the workshop scenario matrices into one scenario 
matrix, and 2) Considering the pre-survey results and futures wheels. 
3.3.1 Restructuring the workshop scenario matrices 
To obtain an understanding of the factors identified in the two groups, the first step in this 
process was to cluster all the factors of the two scenario matrices (Figure 11 and Figure 12). 
The emerging clusters, their description and two examples for each cluster are given in Table 
5. By clustering the team aimed at identifying the common characteristics of the two scenario 
matrices, so that closely related factors would fall in the same quadrant in the final matrix. 
Table 5. Emerging clusters, their descriptions and two examples of each cluster. 
Cluster Description Example 
Cooperation Cooperation and diplomacy Conflict-free Arctic 
Transparency and 
monitoring  international 
overseeing body 
Conflict Conflicts involving military  Military conflict 
New balance in the military 
activities in the Arctic  
consequences for Indigenous 
people 
Disaster Natural and environmental 
disasters or accidents affecting 
people and the environment  
Increasing tourism, oil and 
gas drilling and navigation, 
but with increasing risk for 
accidents 
Too much trust in 
technology  major 
pollution accident  
(Green) innovations  Innovations, particularly 
cleantech and navigation 
Dominance of private actors 
with interest in clean Arctic 
environment  e.g. 
renewable energy businesses 
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Sufficient funding for clean 
tech R&D, including new 
funding forms (e.g. crowd-
sourcing) 
Bad regulation Lack of regulation to control 
development 
Little investment in safety 
technologies, since not 
required by rules and 
regulations 
Development at any cost 
Good regulation Enforced rules and regulations 
to control development 
Carrying capacity of nature 
gets established and can be 
translated into guidelines 
License to operate 
Privatization Development and resources in 
the hands of private actors 
Arctic states are “owned” by 
the global corporations 
(corporate colony) 
Denial of common property 
rights 
National interest Development and resources in 
the hands of public actors 
Only governmental 
companies are allowed to 
operate 
Rise in oil and gas 
exploration Russia/Norway 
public interest 
Wellbeing Social wellbeing and health Prioritizing of economic 
development over social and 
environmental concerns 
Improving physical and 
mental health of habitants 
Environmental 
degradation 
Decreasing quality of 
ecosystems and natural 
resources 
Quick depletion of finite 
resources in the Arctic: 
unsustainable exploitation 
(especially fish) 
Ecosystem degradation 
Influx Influx of migrant workers and 
its consequences 
More migratory workers in 
the Arctic with large 
differences in wealth of 
people 
Fly-in-fly-out Arctic 
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Poor infrastructure Poor quality of physical and 
social infrastructure  
Problems in maintaining the 
infrastructure and basic 
services (health care, 
education,..) for people 
Lack of social infrastructure 
Risk management Lack of or availability of risk 
management technologies 
Transparency and 
monitoring provides 
sufficient control – power 
for stakeholders 
Insufficient safety standards 
due to insufficient 
technologies 
Indigenous Indigenous peoples Settled land claims 
agreement 
Irresponsibility for 
Indigenous people and 
claims 
Environmental 
awareness 
Increased interest of the 
general public towards 
environmental sustainability 
Awareness raising and 
education has created a 
general acceptance of 
sustainability concept 
Global environmental 
awakening  power to 
NGOs 
Benevolence Private interest towards 
environmental sustainability 
Benevolent owner 
Land trust 
Preserve Arctic as a sanctuary Arctic as a natural preserve 
Slow/no development 
No commercial 
incentive 
No commercial incentives to 
operate in the Arctic 
Uncertainty and risks are too 
high (political and natural, 
e.g. dynamics of climate, 
regulation) 
Alternative places for 
revenue generation 
Narrative Outliers Scientific tourism 
Seasonal differences 
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The second step was to determine a combined scenario matrix dimensions based on the two 
separate matrices constructed during the workshop. Since the dimension Open-closed 
describes an important dimension of the possible future political and economic development, 
it was chosen as one of the dimensions. Therefore, it was decided that the second dimension 
should be taken from the original matrix with the dimension clean – dirty reflecting the 
environmental status of the Arctic region, due to its major role in the future of the Arctic. 
Clean was also interpreted as decarbonised. A third dimension added to the scenario was the 
dimension of whom will take the initiative on the development of the Arctic: the private or 
the public sector. As unbounded – regulated and private – public were considered to be close 
to each other in terms of their content, it was decided that these should be combined in the 
final scenarios. After this, all the factors from the two original matrices were positioned in 
the new, final scenario space. Some of the factors were ambiguous on either of the 
dimensions open – closed / clean – dirty, and was therefore placed in the middle of the scale. 
3.3.2 Incorporating pre-survey results and futures wheels 
The last step was to ensure that the logics found in the futures wheel are considered in the 
narratives. This was done by checking that the narratives are consistent with the futures 
wheels. If new ideas arouse, they were added to the narratives. 
The two most important global drivers according to the pre-survey (climate change and level 
of international co-operation) have been included in the narratives since they also came up 
extensively in the workshop. The following three most important global drivers 
(environmental awareness, global demand for fossil fuels and global climate policy) are 
included in the scenario dimension dirty-clean. The majority of the local drivers were also 
discussed in the workshop, but a few did not receive attention most likely due to the 
background of the participants. Therefore, for instance, competitiveness of the Northern Sea 
Route compared to other trade routes received less attention and has not been included 
consistently in the narratives. 
Based on the new three-dimensional scenario space, a total of six short narratives were 
created (see Table 6). Private - Closed- Clean and Public – Closed – Clean were merged into 
one narrative, since they did not distinguish from each other clearly. The same applies to 
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Private- Dirty – Closed and Public – Dirty – Closed. In these scenarios, it was considered 
that the initiator (whether it is public or private) does not have a crucial role in the 
development from the WMS point of view. 
Table 6. The dimensions and names of the six scenarios. 
Scenario Private-Public Open-Closed Clean-Dirty Scenario name 
1 Private Open Dirty “Wild West” 
2 Private Open Clean “Silicon Valley” 
3 Public Open Dirty “Exploited 
Colony” 
4 Public Open Clean “Shangri La” 
5 Private & 
Public 
Closed Dirty “Conflict Zone” 
6 Private & 
Public 
Closed Clean “Antarctic” 
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4 Results: Six socio-economic scenarios for Eurasian Arctic by 
2040 
As described above, the process for scenario construction proceeded through various phases. 
All this input was refined in the form of six final narratives describing six plausible but 
different socio-economic scenarios for the development of the Eurasian Arctic by 2040. 
These final narratives (summarised in Table 7) are given below. The scenario participants 
were given a chance to comment on the final scenarios; the original scenario descriptions 
were modified based on the comments received. The final scenario descriptions are 
considered plausible by the experts who participated in the workshop. 
4.1 Private – Open - Dirty: “Wild West” 
 The Arctic area in 2040 is described by a laissez-faire economic development driven 
by the private sector and economic development is prioritized over social and 
environmental concerns. This leads to haphazard growth and problems in maintaining 
infrastructure and basic services (such as health care, education). Land use is 
uncontrolled and transitions haphazard. Development is in the hands of investors and 
large/multi-national corporations and Arctic resources are mostly privatized. 
Common property rights are either non-regulated or based on too loose quotas 
compared to the environmental carrying capacity, and therefore natural resources 
(e.g. fish) are overharvested and ecosystems will degrade. 
 Sea ice retreat is used as an excuse to enter the area, which creates a snow ball effect 
in which new actors start exploiting activities in an accelerating pace as they rapidly 
follow the successful first movers. This leads to a rise in economic activities (oil, gas, 
tourism). Since the risk of accidents is high, accidents of varying severity occur, such 
as oil spills, shipwrecks and ballast water discharges from ships. This increases the 
need for search & rescue operations.  
 Technological development is making geoengineering a viable way to mitigate 
climate change which in the long term will slow down the progress of sea ice retreat. 
However, it affects the global climate and generates new ecological and social 
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impacts. Thus, there is discussion on the rules of geoengineering and it is not in large-
scale use yet. 
 Clean technology will lose its competitiveness due to lack of regulative incentives 
and the development of the Arctic relies on environmentally unsustainable 
technologies, such as fossil fuels or bottom trawling. There is insufficient or no 
(international) regulations and law enforcement to guide exploration and exploitation, 
which will lead to little investment in safety technologies as it is not required by rules 
and regulations. 
 Non-Arctic nations will have increased access to Arctic resources leading to their 
increased economic, military, cultural and political power in the Arctic. 
 Indigenous peoples and their claims are ignored and their subsistence is at risk. 
Hunting and reindeer herding are close to vanishing. 
4.2 Private – Open – Clean: “Silicon Valley” 
 Society in 2040 has realized the natural carrying capacity of the Arctic through 
extensive R&D and communication thereof to society through strong science-policy 
dialogues. Climate change has progressed as projected and society has had time to 
adapt to the changes. Awareness raising, education and global environmental 
awakening have created generally accepted sustainability standards and guidelines 
that comply with the carrying capacity of Arctic. This gives more power to NGOs 
and creates sufficient trust between various stake- and rights-holders.  
 Clean technologies boom and are competitive. New and sufficient funding forms (e.g. 
crowdsourcing) enable innovations and breakthroughs in technology. 
 Green and clean entrepreneurship dominate the economy and firms compete actively 
for the best environmental performance. The scientific community is actively 
involved in product development and innovation. Product certification and reward-
fine systems communicate the environmental performance of economic activities and 
products. 
 New international organizations and mechanisms emerge to resolve domestic and 
international conflicts and to monitor activities in the Arctic. However, responsibility 
in case of accidents and everyday-life events relies on private insurances. 
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 Regardless of good economic and environmental performance, social well-being in 
many Arctic regions lags behind. Corporations lack social integrity inside the Arctic, 
which is why social infrastructure is not as developed as other infrastructure and high 
level welfare and health care services are not universally available. Work–related 
immigration to the Arctic creates large differences in the wealth of people, and the 
economy relies largely on a “fly in fly out” work force.  
4.3 Public – Open - Dirty: “Exploited Colony” 
 In 2040, the development of the Arctic region is heavily guided by short-term profit 
seeking behaviour where only immediate benefits count. Public debates are focused 
on economic issues, resulting in public acceptance to the short-term utilization of 
Arctic resources. Oil and gas resources are heavily exploited by companies which are 
largely publicly owned and operate in close guidance and collaboration with the 
public sector. The companies are seen as important pillars of national economies, yet 
there are high corruption rates. 
 Climate change has progressed faster than expected, which incites selfish behaviour 
among countries and companies. There is no scientific or political agreement on the 
natural carrying capacity of the Arctic, and the global climate system is thus not 
considered a constraining factor for Arctic development.  
 Rules and regulations, including taxes/fines, are too weak to lead to a balanced 
sustainable development where social and environmental concerns are on equal 
footing with economic targets. The area is developed at any cost.  
 The area is exploited with insufficient safety standards due to lacking safety 
technologies. 
 Deep sea mining is permitted and practiced also in the high seas areas of the Arctic.  
 There is a high influx of workers to the area because of increased employment 
possibilities in ports, construction, other infrastructure, tourism and services. This 
leads to hub-based development, which attracts also local communities resulting in 
major changes in land use, for example increased urbanization. The areas outside the 
hubs remain short of any progress. 
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 Socio-economic inequalities in the area are pronounced and conflicts arise between 
native people, immigrant workers and public authorities.  
4.4 Public – Open – Clean: “Shangri La” 
 The Arctic area in 2040 has established a sustainable balance between environmental, 
social and economic conditions. Natural resources are managed sustainably and there 
are strong health policies resulting in improved physical and mental health as well as 
improved wellbeing of Arctic inhabitants.  
 Regulation is based on public deliberation, accurate climate and nature’s carrying 
capacity information, and sustainability considerations. All land claim agreements 
(between the indigenous population and other Arctic citizens) have been settled. 
 Economic actors have a strong bias for Arctic environmental protection and 
conservation, which encourages investments in R&D of clean technology. As one 
result, tourism causes limited stress for the Arctic environment.  
 Extensive shipping takes place and wide cooperation on navigation is practiced. 
Further cooperation takes place in searching new technological solutions for 
navigating in ice conditions, combatting oil spills in icy conditions, construction work 
in permafrost areas and harnessing renewable energy potential under Arctic 
conditions. 
 Overall, national, regional and international regulation is clear and precise and is 
practiced from a responsible and equalized viewpoint. Regulation consists of 
incentive-based policies and license systems, which are a result of awareness raising, 
public information sharing and exchange delivered by media campaigns.  
 A global consensus of a conflict-free Arctic prevails and new co-operative Arctic 
institutions emerge. These institutions possess mechanisms for domestic and 
international conflict resolution. High trust in compliance is achieved by inter-
governmental surveillance and monitoring. 
 Regulated, small-scale aquaculture provides sustainable livelihood to local 
communities. 
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4.5 Closed - Dirty: “Conflict Zone” 
 In 2040, political instability is high and the Arctic is riddled by political conflicts and 
non-secure conditions. Also global instability prevails because of unbalanced 
distribution of resources, such as clean water. Conflicts about, for instance, land rights 
and livelihood activities between states and the native people occur. Arctic countries 
have permanent and large-scale military presence in the area and military conflicts 
are taking place. 
 International and Pan-Arctic organizations have no mandate in regulating the area 
and Arctic states lack sufficient enforcement capability.  
 Environmental and other safety issues are considered secondary to national security, 
which leads to high risk operations and several environmental disasters taking place.  
 The uncertain and unstable conditions together with the lack of infrastructure hinder 
long term private investments.  
4.6 Closed – Clean: “Antarctic” 
 In 2040, an international Arctic Treaty is adopted supported by strong global climate 
policy. The international community decides that uncertainty and risks related to the 
impacts of Arctic resource exploitation on climate change and environmental 
degradation are too high, and it is safer to turn the Arctic into a sanctuary.  
 The global economy is decarbonized and renewable resources are politically fostered. 
 Based on the treaty, the Arctic area is regulated so that there is loss of extractive 
economic interest resulting in a cleaner environment. Some small-scale economic 
activities are sustained; such as limited eco- and scientific tourism. Stakeholders and 
rightsholders are committed to preserving natural habitats with instruments such as 
land trusts. The few private tourism companies concentrate on minimizing their 
environmental impact. The companies fear loss of reputation.  
 Indigenous peoples gain strong land rights and strong constituencies. Also other 
residents enjoy stable, yet economically less developed living conditions. Any 
infrastructure is ran by de-centralized renewable energy. 
 Heavy regulation limits activities in the Arctic, which in turn decreases demand for 
new technological solutions. Thus, innovations in Arctic technology are slow.  
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 Scientific, exclusive, (self-)regulated tourism to the unique areas (North Pole, 
Northern Sea Route) takes place. 
Table 7 summarizes the narratives and provides a preliminary analysis for the sectors that are 
relevant for the TWASE project and Table 8 presents the implications of each scenario for 
WMS.  
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Table 7. Interpretation of the narratives for the WMS relevant sectors  
 “Wild West” “Silicon 
Valley” 
“Exploited 
Colony” 
“Shangri La” “Conflict 
Zone” 
“Antarctic” 
Framing 
uncertainties 
Private – open - 
dirty  
Private – open -
clean 
Public – open - 
dirty 
Public– open -
clean 
Closed -dirty Closed -clean 
Resource 
extraction 
Low hanging 
fruits 
Efficient; 
Respects 
carrying 
capacity 
Inefficient, old 
technology 
Regulated, 
Sustainable 
technologies 
Causes 
conflicts 
None 
 
Tourism Popular 
destination 
Responsible 
tourism 
Difficult access Responsible 
tourism  
None Exclusive 
Shipping Traffic jams Traffic with 
minimum 
environmental 
impact 
Supports 
resource 
extraction 
Traffic 
regulated by 
international 
bodies 
Military Tourism and 
research 
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Table 8. Implications of each scenario for Weather and Marine Services 
Scenario  Implications for Weather and Marine Services 
“Wild West” High demand for sector specific situational information (from oil, gas and tourism sectors, Search and 
Rescue operations) 
“Silicon Valley” High demand; Open data; competitive market (from green and clean entrepreneurs, scientific 
community, NGOs, private insurances) 
“Exploited Colony” Medium demand both for situational information and more general observations (from oil, gas, 
construction, other infrastructure, tourism) 
“Shangri La” High demand; Tailored services (for shipping, clean technology, tourism) 
“Conflict Zone” Low demand for commercial services, high demand for situational awareness and strategically important 
observations (for military) 
“Antarctic” Low demand in general, mainly for scientific purposes (for eco- and scientific tourism) 
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5 Conclusions 
This report has covered conditions, drivers and trends in the Arctic based on a diverse set of 
sources and methods. As we show, there is potentially a lot of pressure for major changes in 
the Eurasian Arctic. Among others, environmental changes, political shifts and technological 
development can all push forward drastic new developments. Then again, it is possible that 
despite all the hype and interest, the Arctic remains a backwater of the global economy. All 
this emphasizes the need for any decision-maker to be able to respond in very different 
futures. The Arctic calls for robust decision-making, a good eye for weak signals and tipping 
points and the ability to prepare for risks and seize opportunities as they emerge. The scenario 
work described in this report aims to serve these needs within the TWASE project and for a 
broader audience. 
The six scenarios for Eurasian Arctic by 2040 anticipate changes of different scale and scope 
in society from three dimensions: open – closed, public - private and dirty – clean. The 
dimensions describe the state of the environment, political atmosphere, economic 
development and general ambience towards the Arctic. The scenarios also take a stand on 
social, technological and legal factors affecting the development of the Eurasian Arctic. 
Overall, the scenarios aim at a holistic approach in anticipating the socio-economic 
developments in the Eurasian Arctic from the point of view of tourism, resource extraction 
and the shipping industries. In addition, the resulting six scenarios are the first scenarios for 
the Arctic that have also considered the future need for WMS. Only one out of the six 
scenarios shows low demand for WMS, which implies that it is highly recommended to 
develop WMSs. 
Our methodology enables the construction of a comprehensive set of socio-economic 
scenarios when the participating expert pool is versatile enough; the resulting scenarios 
emphasise variety of alternative futures and choices inside the futures. However, a clear 
limitation of the scenario construction process is that the number of experts that participated 
in the workshop was rather modest. Yet, as a whole, the process resulted in a justified set of 
possible futures for the Eurasian Arctic by 2040. The scenarios provide an adequate outline 
of possible futures and consequences, and associations between trends and events. 
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Keil, Kathrin Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS), The Arctic 
Institute 
Kjelaas, Anton Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Centre (NERSC) 
and CodarNor A/S  
Lensu, Mikko  FMI  
Niskanen, Tuomas FMI  
Pelyasov, Alexander Centre for Northern and Arctic Economies  
Perrels, Adriaan  FMI  
Vihma, Timo  FMI  
Votsis, Athanasios FMI  
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Appendix 2 Pre-survey questions 
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
1. Is your official work location in 2014 and 2015: 
a. in Finland (please don’t count short term assignments abroad) 
b. Outside Finland 
c. Alternatingly in Finland and elsewhere 
 
2. The sector in which you work is (NB if the public organisation in which you work 
has clearly a sector specific function you can tick 2 options, e.g. in case of a port 
authority (a. + d.)): 
a. Public administration 
b. Research (University or other public sector) 
c. Natural resource extraction (oil, gas, mining) 
d. Marine transport 
e. Other transport 
f. Tourism 
g. Fisheries 
h. NGO 
i. other, being ….. 
 
3. What part(s) of the Arctic are relevant for your organisation (more than 1 answer 
possible): 
a. The entire Arctic 
b. The Eurasian Arctic (Kara Sea to Bering Strait) 
c. The North-American Arctic 
d. The Barents Sea 
e. The Arctic Ocean (core Arctic) 
f. Other, namely …    
 
4. How important are the development prospects of the Arctic (or parts thereof) for 
your organisation? 
a. Crucial (i.e. can ‘make or break’ the organisation) 
b. Important (changed prospects affect the size and/or structure of the organisation) 
c. Somewhat important (some changes in the organisation and/or careers) 
d. Barely or not important  
 
5. When you think about prospects for the Arctic, the typical timeframe for you is: 
a. Up to 2025 
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b. 2025 – 2040 
c. 2040 – 2060 
d. 2060 – 2100 
e. Other, being …. 
 
6. Do you foresee that the organisation (or department) in which you work will 
become: 
a. More engaged in Arctic activities in the next 10 years 
b. More or less continue at the current level of engagement 
c. Less engaged in Arctic activities in the next 10 years 
d. … additional comment / additional option 
 
7. What is the nature of your stake(s) in the Arctic (max. 3) 
a. Environmental protection 
b. Livelihood of indigenous people 
c. Safety and security (of inhabitants and economic activities) 
d. Research 
e. Enabling or implementing natural resource extraction 
f. Enabling or implementing navigation 
g. Enabling or protecting something else, being: …. 
QUESTIONS ON ARCTIC DRIVERS 
8. We list here a set of driving forces that drive the global development. How important 
are these drivers? Consider that the timeframe is up to 2050. Indicate the 
importance in scale of 1-5 (1=not important at all, 5=extremely important). You may 
also choose the option “no opinion/don’t know”: 
a. Global demand of fossil fuels 
b. Global demand for minerals 
c. Fossil fuel price levels 
d. Mineral price levels 
e. Global economy 
f. Climate change 
g. Level of international co-operation 
h. Environmental awareness 
i. Other, namely 
 
9. We list here a set of driving forces that drive the local development of the Arctic. 
How important are these drivers? Consider that the timeframe is up to 2050. 
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Indicate the importance in scale of 1-5 (1=not important at all, 5=extremely 
important). You may also choose the option “no opinion/don’t know”: 
a. Arctic treaties (navigation and environmental) 
b. International co-operation in the Arctic 
c. National climate policy 
d. Common Arctic security policy 
e. Geopolitical situation (tense vs. cooperative) 
f. Emphasizing territorial presence (e.g. by keeping areas populated) 
g. Utilization and accessibility of mineral resources 
h. Utilization and accessibility of fossil fuel reserves 
i. The prices of minerals and fossil fuels 
j. Competitiveness of the Northern Sea Route compared to other trade routes 
k. Tourism 
l. Marine fisheries 
m. Extreme natural conditions and their variability 
n. Minimizing risks of natural and manmade hazards 
o. Development of Arctic engineering (including control of extreme conditions) 
p. Development/coverage/distribution of infrastructure 
q. Development in satellite technology 
r. Developments in shipbuilding technology and winter navigation technology 
s. Land rights (not including the off-shore locations) 
t. Certification of Arctic products and services (greentech and cleantech) 
u. Livelihoods of indigenous peoples 
v. Perspective of sustainable development 
w. Other, namely 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WORKSHOP 
10. What do you expect from the workshop? 
a. Free word 
 
11. Do you wish to receive the results of this questionnaire and of the summary report 
of the workshop of 30/31 March? 
a. YES 
b. NO 
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